

**Departament de Filosofia & Centre d'Història
de la Ciència (CEHIC)**

PROF. DR. OLAF MÜLLER
(Berlin)
◆ 2 TALKS ◆



PRAGMATIC PACIFISM

According to pragmatic pacifism, our objective knowledge about any war is much too poor to permit an evaluation from a consequentialist perspective. Even our best accounts of any pre-war situation are value-laden. This explains why pacifists and their opponents never agree about so-called (and non-trivial) facts: different values enter into their descriptions. But although this is legitimate for both sides, the pacifist values are more attractive than those of the bellicist. This opens up a novel middle way between the *Scylla* of rigorous pacifism and the *Charybdis* of just war theory with truly consequentialist elements.

Sala de reuniones, Dep. de Filosofia - Thursday, February 4, 11:00-13:00

COLOUR, LIGHT, AND DARKNESS:

GOETHE'S ATTACK ON NEWTON'S *OPTICKS* – REOPENING AN OLD CASE

Goethe's objections to Newton's theory of light and colours are better than usually acknowledged. According to Goethe's new experiments, many colour phenomena from Newton's *Opticks* have dualistic counterparts; there is an optical symmetry, or duality, or polarity, between light and darkness. Goethe had the strong intuition that this very polarity is true throughout the whole realm of colour experiments, but of course, he was far from being able to prove this. The considerable potential this idea may have for optical research has so far been underestimated and underexplored. One reason for this neglect has to do with the fact that some of Goethe's adherents extended the idea of polarity excessively and dubiously – outside optics. If it had not been for this misuse, physicists might have shown a less hostile reaction to Goethe's *Theory of Colours* (*Farbenlehre*). Bad luck for Goethe.

Seminar room, L3-05, Centre d'Història de la Ciència - Friday, February 5, 12:00-14:00

Biographical Note

Prof. Dr. Olaf L. Mueller is Chair of Philosophy at Humboldt University (Berlin). In his books, he argues against Quine's philosophy of language (1998), against skepticism with a new version of Putnam's argument against the brain-in-a-vat scenario (2003), in favour of metaphysics (2003) and of moral observation (2008), and reconstructs Goethe's attack on Newton's optics (2015). In his papers, he defends freedom against the neurosciences, pacifism against adherents of just war, and dualism against materialism.

All welcome.

Organized by: Thomas Sturm (Thomas.Sturm@uab.cat)

Departament de Filosofia & Centre d'Història de la Ciència (CEHIC)